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During the 1990s the leadership of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) has 
undergone increasingly frequent and extensive personnel changes. Although these 
changes have been most noted among the higher ranking officers in the Armed Forces 
and Army leadership, these rotations and promotions in fact extend throughout the 
commissioned officer corps. Each reshuffle of senior officers stimulates a chain of 
further transfers, rotations, and promotions to fill vacant positions and maintain 
institutional integrity as well as personal networks.
In early 1992, in the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre,1 the sacking of several 
prominent generals stimulated a first wave of personnel changes. This was followed in 
mid-1992 by the replacement of all top Army leaders, the largest single overhaul of the 
officer corps since the mid-1980s. When they had been only just completed, these 
changes were followed in April and August 1993 by further waves of personnel shifts 
under the direction of the short-tenured Commander-in-Chief General Edi Sudradjat. 
The following year, 1994, saw two more major waves of personnel changes, one in 
January at Armed Forces headquarters and the other in August within the Army high 
command. The most sweeping set of transfers to date came in early 1995, involving 
wholesale personnel changes at the Armed Forces Headquarters and the Army central
1 The background to and importance of the November 1991 massacre in the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, 
East Timor, are discussed in The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: July 1,1989- 
January 1,1992," Indonesia 53 (April 1992): 137-164; hereafter dted as "Current Data" with appropriate 
issue number in text.
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and regional commands. In short, between 1992 and 1994, major personnel changes 
among the military elite took place twice a year; in 1995 there were five major waves of 
transfers, and in 1996 another four.
Observers of the Indonesian military have suggested a number of explanations for 
these changes and interpretations of their significance for the broader political 
constellation. Three of these are worth noting.
First, analysis during the early 1990s highlighted what were seen to be growing 
tensions between President Suharto and his "Palace Circle," on the one hand, and 
senior Army officers led by General L. B. (Benny) Murdani, on the other. Evaluating 
top military appointments during this period, the editors of the journal Indonesia paid 
particular attention to the tensions between military professionalism and Presidential 
favoritism. ("Current Data," No. 53, pp. 93,97) The editors argued that "changes in the 
military leadership since early 1992 can be most profitably understood as an outcome 
of complex negotiations between the Palace and the military leadership represented by 
Edi Sudradjat." ("Current Data," No. 55, p. 181) A year later, analysis continued to 
highlight what were seen to be "palace-inspired countermeasures and/or 
supplementary rectifications" against the senior officer corps. ("Current Data," No. 56, 
p. 123) The upshot of this analysis was that, thanks to the craftiness of President 
Suharto, "the army is now deeply divided." ("Current Data," No. 58, p. 84)
The latest analysis by the editors of Indonesia continued to focus on the presumed 
tensions between the Palace circle and the Army elite, now, however, largely within 
the context of ABRI's own discourse on regenerasi. Thus large-scale transfers and 
promotions within the military elite were interpreted as being "directly related to the 
replacement of the Presidential brother-in-law, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Wismoyo 
Arismunandar, in February 1995 . . .  and the related 'regenerasi' of the Armed Forces." 
("Current Data," No. 60, p. 101)
A second, more recent, line of analysis examining changes within the ABRI elite 
considers military-Islamic relations. Focusing on the top command positions within 
ABRI, Harold Crouch has argued that the appointment in 1995 of General Feisal 
Tanjung as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Panglima ABRI) and R. 
Hartono as Army Chief of Staff reveals a move towards more cordial military-Islamic 
relations.2 Indeed, both Feisal and Hartono have made overtures to national as well as 
local Islamic leaders.
A third line of analysis concentrates on preparations for the upcoming 1997-98 
parliamentary and presidential elections. According to one source, the recent transfers 
were intended to ensure "a similarity of political vision in the military in facing the 
1997 elections and the 1998 General Session of the People's Consultative Council will 
be neatly in place."3 This explanation has been encouraged by members of the military 
and eagerly disseminated by the Indonesian media. Contributing to this analysis, in 
early 1996 Harold Crouch argued that the ongoing personnel changes were not only 
intended to ensure that members of the military elite had a similar outlook ("pemikiran
2 "ABRI dan Islam/' Tiros, February 23,1995.
3 "Gelombang Mutasi di Tubuh ABRI," Tiros, June 29,1995.
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yang seragam"), but also to prepare new figures to appear on the political stage 
following the 1997-98 elections.4
While each of these arguments contains an important element of truth about ABRI, 
none provides an adequate explanation for the situation at hand: the increasingly 
frequent and extensive personnel changes within ABRI. The appointment of two new 
officers to head the military is unlikely to assuage poor military-Islamic relations. 
Similarly, several new appointments are by no means sufficient to guarantee "a 
similarity of political vision" within an institution as large as the Indonesian armed 
forces. Finally, gossip-mongering that interprets a massive institution in terms of a few 
personalities and the political connections they enjoy is nothing but a substitute for 
analysis.
Changing Size of the Officer Corps
How, then, are we to explain the increasingly frequent transfer of senior military 
officers dining the 1990s? The answer, I believe, does not lie in pre-election or post­
succession political posturing in Jakarta, but rather in Magelang, Central Java, home of 
the Akademi Militer Nasional (National Military Academy, AMN), some three decades 
ago.
The AMN was established in 1957 as part of then-ABRI Commander-in-Chief 
General Nasution's ongoing effort to turn a regionally-based guerrilla army into a 
professional as well as national military.5 Inducted in 1957, the first AMN class totaling 
fifty-nine officers graduated three years later, in 1960. The following three AMN 
Classes (1961-63) averaged 125 graduates each. During the next several years, 
however, the intake of cadets and size of graduating AMN classes varied widely. The 
total doubled in each of the next years, with Class 5 1964 graduating 280 officers and 
Class 6 1965 graduating 433 officers. Although the number of graduates fell to an 
average of two hundred officers for the next two years, class size again peaked after 
that, with Class 9 1968 graduating 465 officers. Because of the institutional shift 
introduced in 1965 from a three- to a four-year educational program and the change of 
name from AMN to Akademi Militer (Akmil), no class graduated in 1969. And 
although Class size continued to fluctuate, between 1970 and 1975 Akmil graduated an 
average of four hundred officers per year. (See Table 1.)
4 "Crouch: ABRI Rapatkan Barisan," Merdeka, February 24,1996. The article reports that "ABRI leaders are 
now preparing champions to be brought forward when the time is right" ("pimpinan ABRI saat ini sedang 
mempersiapkan jago-jagonya untuk ditampilkan pada saatnya nanti").
5 Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia 11 (April 
1971): 131-176, and Indonesia 13 (April 1972): 147-182.
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Table 1
Cadets Graduated from the National Military Academy
Class
Number Year
AMN and AKMIL 
Graduates
1 1960 59
2 1961 151
3 1962 112
4 1963 113
5 1964 280
6 1965 433
7 1966 243
8 1967 203
9 1968 465
1969 no class
10 1970 437
11 1971 329
12 1972 389
13 1973 436
14 1974 434
15 1975 304
16 1976 85
17 1977 79
18 1978 93
1979 no class
19 1980 102
20 1981 146
21 1982 85
1983 no class
22 1984 244
Source: Madjalah Akabri (various); mimeographed class list circulating in Jakarta, source 
unknown. It should be noted that the Class numbering system used here differs from that 
in our previous listings.
There is no official explanation for this wide variation in the size of AMN/Akmil 
graduating classes during the 1960s and early 1970s. Several possibilities are available, 
however. First, when the AMN opened in 1957, it was not the only military academy in 
Indonesia. Even after the AMN opened, the Academy for Military Technology in 
Bandung (Akmil Jurtek), a training ground for army engineers and technical 
specialists, continued to operate. Between 1964 and 1966, however, technical programs 
gradually were moved from Akmil Jurtek in Bandung to the AMN in Magelang, thus 
adding an additional 120 cadets to the AMN class total.
Curriculum development at the AMN was not limited to institutional 
consolidation. When the AMN first opened, educational specialization was limited to 
four expressly military courses: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Anti-aircraft. In 1964, 
along with the addition of the first course from the Akmil Jurtek Bandung, the AMN
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also added a series of further specializations—Military Police, Transport, 
Quartermaster, Health, Adjutant General, Finance, and Law. But if this expansion of 
the military curriculum and total number of cadets was initially part of General 
Nasution's effort to professionalize the military, it also, undoubtedly, squared well 
with the army's ongoing power-struggle with Sukarno and the PKI. Specialization and 
professional skills would be necessary for the military's expansion into the economy 
and the state. It was this expansion of the curriculum that first swelled the AMN class 
size from an average of 120 officers to 280 officers graduating in 1964.
Less easily explained is the further doubling in the number of cadets inducted into 
the AMN in 1962 and graduated as officers in Class 6 1965. The available data reveals 
that it was not an increase in the number of courses or specializations offered that 
swelled the number of officers (courses in fact were reduced by two), but rather a near 
threefold increase in the number of Infantry cadets inducted. The most plausible 
(although wholly unsubstantiated) explanation is that this was a response to 
international political tensions, specifically the 1962 Mandala campaign to seize Dutch- 
held Irian Barat and the 1963 Kortfrontasi with Malaysia, and the perceived need for 
officers to command combat troops. Interesting as it might be to know the reasons for 
this increase in Infantry cadets, for our purposes it is sufficient to note that Class 61965 
was thus substantially larger than all previous AMN classes, a point to which I will 
return shortly.
The drop in the size of AMN Class 7 1966 and Class 8 1967 resulted from a 
combination of the above two factors. While the total number of graduating Infantry 
cadets dropped roughly 25 percent, these years also saw the suspension of a number of 
service specializations, including Transport, Quartermaster, Health, and so forth. 
These reductions were temporary, however, and Class 9 1968 ballooned to 466 
graduates, the largest ever. Here, too, die increase is seen in the number of Infantry 
cadets, the total rising to 331 or fully three-quarters of the entire class. Again, it is not 
clear if this increase was related to external security concerns, as I suggested in the case 
of Class 6 1965, or internal military politics involving the institutional shift from the 
AMN to Akmil.6
In any case, this tremendous increase and the subsequent fluctuation in the size of 
the army officer corps graduating from the AMN and Akmil in the 1960s and early 
1970s raises a series of related problems. Given that the number of upper-level 
positions within the military has remained roughly constant, this variation in the size 
of the officer corps could have a direct and lasting impact on the promotional 
prospects of these officers. On the one hand, the swollen class size means that a smaller 
percentage of officers from a given AMN class could be promoted to senior ranks and 
given correspondingly strategic and/or lucrative postings. On the other hand, the 
relative "success" of a single, large AMN class might hold back the promotion of 
subsequent classes. In either case, the resulting deterioration of promotional prospects 
would likely lead to discontent among the officer corps.
Over the past several years, members of the Indonesian military elite have 
intimated that just such a promotional log-jam is taking place within both the Army
6 These figures are only for Army cadets (Angkatan Darat), not for all four service branches at the newly 
reconstituted Akmil.
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and the Armed Forces high command. In March, 1996, Forum Keadilan titled a special 
feature "When there is a Promotional Log-jam at the Top." The feature examined the 
institutional dilemma "when, for the first time ever, two Lieutenant Generals are 
entitled to be promoted to the same position" and went on to note that two other active 
Lieutenant Generals were still awaiting assignment because no positions were vacant.7 
Major General Theo Syafei, a member of the ABRI Fraction of Parliament (F-ABRI DPR 
RI) labeled the problem "General Inflation," attributing it the policy of assigning rank 
on the basis of an officer's position within the Armed Forces. Syafei's comments 
initiated a highly revealing debate over the current system and procedures for 
transfers and promotions with ABRI. Tati Darsoyo, another member of the ABRI 
Fraction of Parliament, questioned the root of the dilemma: "Is this [issue of 
assignments] wrong and problematic because we assign position and role in 
accordance with rank or because of some other reason?" Similarly, the usually staid 
Minister of Security, General Edi Sudradjat, asked flatly "Are rotations taking place too 
quickly?" In answer to his own question, Edi noted that the military as an institution 
would settle the matter, a clear reference to maintaining a hierarchy that honored 
military professionalism over personal or Palace preference.8
Although public debate was limited to the assignment of senior officers, the 
problem is not. Indeed, as I will argue, the underlying problem may not be "rank 
inflation," but rather the changing size of the officer corps and the structural pressures 
that this is placing on the Armed Forces as an institution.
If aware of the dilemma posed by a promotional log-jam, the Indonesia military 
elite could respond in several ways. One response would be to accelerate the transfer 
and rotation of officers while reducing their individual tenure in a given position, thus 
providing as many officers as possible an opportunity to hold the much-coveted 
command positions. A second response would be to exploit the opportunity presented 
by excess commissioned officers through even greater job specialization. Third, the 
military elite could seek non-military assignments for active officers so as to relieve 
some of the competition for postings; this raises the sensitive issue of "dinaskarya"—the 
policy of assigning military officers to positions in the civil bureaucracy. Finally, army 
leadership might respond by seeking early retirement for officers deemed to be 
expendable or of less than exceptional capacity. While I believe that ABRI has in fact 
used each of these strategies to differing degrees, the remainder of this essay will 
explore the first of these strategies.
Command Tenure
We can begin our evaluation of the above logic by considering the length of tenure 
and graduating class of Army commanders at various levels. Institutional rationality 
calls for militaries to space the rotation of officers as evenly as possible, normally at 
two year intervals. There are two reasons for this: first, a sufficiently long tenure is 
necessary to ensure regional stability; second, regular rotations help to ensure that
7 "Bila Gerbang Mutasi Macet di Atas," Forum Keadilan, March 25,1996, pp. 12-14. The article, of course, 
overstates its case: this was a common occurrence during the 1950s and early 1960s.
8 "Pangab Mengenai Tiga Letjen tak Punya Jabatan," Kompas, March 6,1996.
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officers' expectations are fulfilled and thus prevent rash action—what members of the 
Indonesian military elite nervously refer to as "political adventurism."
In this light, we begin by considering the changing length of tenure of the ten 
Regional Military Commanders (Panglima Kodam, Pangdam). The data in Table 2 
show that over the past decade the average tenure of the ten Pangdam has been cut in 
half, from a full two and a half years during the mid-1980s to a mere sixteen months 
for the last full posting, in the mid-1990s. In other words, the rotation of officers 
serving as Pangdam has accelerated dramatically over the past decade.
Table 2
Tenure of Regional Military Commanders (in months)
Previous commanders (in reverse order from present, March 1,1997)*
5 4 3 2 1 Current
Kodam I 14 22 34 16 13 17+
Kodam II 41 12 12 10 14 6+
Kodam El 25 37 31 26 24 23+
Kodam IV 18 24 9 22 9 14+
Kodam V 24 27 33 34 16 23+
Kodam VI 34 39 3 11 20 23+
Kodam VH 36 21 5 21 17 6+
Kodam VEI 42 10 13 12 12 6+
Kodam DC 41 7 7 10 19 17+
Kodam Jaya 31 29 32 20 16 11+
average 30.6 22.8 17.9 18.2 16.0 14.6+
* The vertical row to the right of the chart lists tenure, in months, for commanders who currently direct 
each Kodam. Vertical row "1" records tenure, in months, for each commander who held the office 
previous to the current commander; vertical row "2" records tenure for the commander who held the 
post prior to "1," and so on.
Political observers, the mass media, and scholars commonly provide analysis of 
personnel changes, particularly in the case of brief command tenures and "snap" 
personrtel changes. The reasons for such cases of "shortened" command tenure 
commonly include unsatisfactory performance, the need to hold someone accountable 
for military misconduct (in incidents such as the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre), 
mandatory retirement, and so forth. When evaluated case by case, these explanations 
clearly bear weight; but case-by-case considerations cannot explain the overall shift in 
the length of tenure of Pangdam illustrated in Table 2. The problem thus remains; how 
to explain the structural shift in the tenure of Pangdam.
The argument developed in the preceding section suggests that the reduced tenure 
and more frequent personnel changes are part of a larger response to the changing size 
of the Army officer corps. This in fact becomes all the more evident when we consider 
the "fate" of particular AMN classes. In this vein, a previous update noted: "the 
unusually large Class 6 (1965) officers held back Class 7 and possibly Class 8 from 
reaching command positions in Korem in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Now 
dominant in the army central and regional commands, Class 6 officers again threaten
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to hold back Class 7,8, and 9 from reaching staff and command positions in the army 
central and regional commands." ("Current Data," No. 58, p. 86) This much is clearly 
correct. More remarkable still is that a number of Pangdam-ships have not simply been 
monopolized by members of the class of 1965, but that this has involved "job sharing" 
among AMN classmates.9 To illustrate this, Table 3 lists the AMN graduating class of 
each officer who held each Pangdam-ship from 1985 until the present.
Table 3
Graduating Classes of Regional Military Commanders,
listed by class number**
1985 -* •* ■> •+ Present
Kodam I 1 7 * 3 2 3 4 7 7
Kodam II * 2 3 5 6 6 6 13
Kodam III 2 3 3 6 7
Kodam IV 1 2 4 4 5 6 7 10
Kodam V * 1 3 6 6
Kodam VI 2 2 2 3 6 6
Kodam VH 1 2 3 6 6 6 9
Kodam VHI 1 2 4 2 5 6 7 8 10
Kodam IX * 2 4 3 3 6 8 7
Kodam Jaya 2 3 2 8 9 9
Note: * denotes an officer educated prior to the creation of the AMN (e.g. at Aktekad Bandung). 
** Officers from Class 1 graduated in I960, officers from Class 2 graduated in 1961, officers from 
Class 3 in 1962, and so forth.
Thus the position of Pangdam II Sriwijaya (south Sumatra) was held by three 
members of the Class 6 1965, each serving for roughly one year.10 Similarly, Kodam VH 
Wirabuana (Sulawesi) had three consecutive Pangdam from Class 6 1965.11 Kodam V 
Brawijaya (East Java) and Kodam VI Tanjungpura (Kalimantan) have each had two 
consecutive Pangdam from Class 6 1965.12 Finally, four of the remaining five Kodam 
previously had one member of Class 61965 serve as Pangdam.
These figures organized by AMN class can be simplified to show the total number 
of officers from each AMN class to serve as Pangdam. This provides one measure of
9 This argument throws further light on the analysis made in "Current Data," Indonesia 55 (April 1993):
180, which attributes the long hold of Class 61965 on Pangdam-ships to class solidarity and the reported 
policy of allowing outgoing officers to recommend their replacement. While this may in fact be the case, it 
will likely carry less weight in consideration of officers to be posted as Pangdam than it will for middle­
ranking officers (e.g. Dandim).
10 These officers were: Syamsir Siregar (1993-94), Yunus Yosfiah (1994-95) and R. Karyono (1995-96).
11 Sofian Effendi (1993-94), Tamlicha Ali (1994-95) and Sulatin (1995 to present).
12 For Kodam V Brawijaya: Haris Sudamo (1993-95) and Imam Utomo (1995 to present). For Kodam VI 
Tanjungpura: Yacob Dasto (1994-95) and Namuri Anoem (1995 to present)
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the relative "success" of each AMN class. Taking into account those officers who 
served as Pangdam in more than one location,13 the totals are:
Table 4
Pangdam by AMN Class
Class Total Pangdam
1(1960) 5
2(1961) 9
3 (1962) 9
4 (1963) 4
5(1964) 3
6(1965) 14
7(1966) 6
8 (1967) 3
9 (1968) 3
10 (1970) 2
11 (1971) -
12 (1972) -
13(1973) 1
14 (1974) -
Clearly, then, the military leadership has responded to variations in the size of the 
officers corps at the senior level not only by reducing the length of tenure of Regional 
Military Commanders, but by instituting a form of "job sharing" among members of a 
given AMN class to ensure that the career ambitions of senior officers are satisfied. The 
result of this, however, is to hold back the promotion of members of Classes 7,8 and 9 
to the much-coveted Pangdam commands.
By all indications a similar acceleration in the transfer and rotation of officers has 
taken place elsewhere in the army. At the Sub-Regional Command (Korem) level the 
aggregate data from the thirty-eight Korem show a less dramatic but nonetheless 
significant reduction in command tenure. Whereas during the 1980s a Korem 
commander enjoyed a tenure of twenty months, this has fallen over the past four to 
five years, with the last full posting averaging a mere twelve months.
Table 5
Tenure of Sub-Regional Military Commanders (Danrem)
(in months)
Officer holders (in reverse order from present)*
5 4 3 2 1 current commander
average 19.6 20.8 19.9 17.8 12.4 11.1+
* See note, Table 2 above.
13 A decade ago it was not uncommon for a Major General to serve as Pangdam in more than one location, 
something that is now unheard of.
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This acceleration of Danrem transfers takes on added importance given the 
emphasis placed on this position following the 1985 army reorganization. At the time 
of the 1985 streamlining of regional commands, Commander-in-Chief General Benny 
Murdani announced that these "new-style Korem" would be the "meritocratic 
breeding-ground of future military leaders of the nation."14 Full analysis of the 
importance of Korem command in determining future military leadership would 
require evaluating the career trajectories of the approximately three hundred officers 
who have served as Danrem since the 1985 reforms, a task whose accomplishment is 
precluded by current time constraints.15 The evidence cited above regarding reduced 
tenure of Korem commanders over the past several years, however, strongly suggests 
that such a strictly meritocratic policy is not being implemented. Rather, a case can be 
made that the problems posed by a swollen officer corps have led to shortened 
command tenure, thus offering less opportunity for Danrem to fully master the 
particular challenges of their commands and, consequently, reducing the base of 
evidence available to those who might try to evaluate meritocratically an officer's 
performance.
Analysis of command tenure is perhaps most important at the middle ranks, 
particularly for District Military Commands (Kodim), the commander of which holds 
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Corresponding roughly to the Kabupaten (Regency) 
administration, the three hundred or so Kodim are the nexus of social control and 
national security. Unfortunately, relatively scarce reporting in the print media makes 
analysis of command tenure most difficult at the Kodim level. And while the available 
data do suggest that the tenure of Kodim commanders has decreased marginally over 
the past decade, statistical analysis is not possible. Nonetheless, several observations 
can be made.
First, tenure of Kodim commanders appears to be shortest in urban centers (one to 
two years), longest in rural areas (two to four years). Assignment as Kodim 
commander in the urban centers of Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Medan is 
generally a sign of a rising career. After one and a half to two years of service, such an 
officer can expect to be promoted to serve as a deputy assistant to the chief of staff of a 
Kodam or as Chief of Staff to a Korem commander in the same region. Assignment as 
Kodim commander in a rural area, however, is likely as not to last for two to four years 
and signal career stagnation. Following such a long posting in a rural backwater, the 
best that could be hoped for would be a civilian posting as Bupati (Regent) or Walikota 
(mayor).
Second, in contrast to the prevailing patterns that determine assignments for 
Kodam and Korem commanders, it is not uncommon for an officer to be posted as 
Kodim commander on more than one occasion, in different regions. For some officers, 
assignment as Kodim commander in a second-tier city may be a stepping-stone to a 
subsequent posting as Kodim commander in a larger urban center. Thus the Kodim
14 Quoted in "Current Data," Indonesia 48 (October 1989): 67-68.
15 Alternatively, we might consider that of the forty-three Kodam commanders installed since January, 
1990, fully 80 percent (34) have previous experience as Korem commanders, and nine of these were 
involved in Korem encompassed by the Kodam they were ultimately promoted to command. These 
figures on the career paths of Kodam commanders diverge sharply from those found by Anderson in the 
late 1980s. See Ben Anderson, "Current Data," Indonesia 48 (October 1989): 67.
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commander of Padang may be transferred to Batam, that of Banyumas to Semarang, 
and so forth. While such a transfer will entail greater responsibility and new 
opportunities to accumulate personal wealth, such officers rarely rise above the rank of 
colonel. They are, for all intents and purposes, local specialists. For officers in rural 
areas, assignment as Kodim commander in more than one location clearly signals 
career stagnation.
In sum, during the 1990s the Indonesian army has experienced increasingly rapid 
transfers of middle-ranking and senior officers. This has included shortened tenure for 
Kodam and Korem commanders as well as "job sharing" among classmates at the 
higher ranks. These changes in the army officer corps cannot not be explained by 
arguments that focus on the legacy of Benny Murdani, by appeals to military-Islamic 
relations, or by the need to "prepare" for the 1997-98 elections. They are, rather, first 
and foremost a function of structural features of the changing size of the army officer 
corps. The increase in the number of cadets graduating from the AMN and Akmil 
during the 1960s and early 1970s has, some thirty years later, placed new pressure on 
the army to satisfy career ambitions. One response available to the military elite has 
been to decrease command tenures and accelerate rotations of officers.
The Promotional Log-Jam Exacerbated?
What, then, is the relationship between the promotional log-jam and the 1997-98 
parliamentary and Presidential "elections"?
As early as November 1995 military leaders announced that the ongoing waves of 
personnel rotations were in preparation for the May 1997 elections, a full year and a 
half away.16 Several months later, following an additional wave of personnel changes, 
members of the military elite made increasingly frequent statements that further 
transfers would not take place until after the 1997 Parliamentary elections. In February 
1996, ABRI Commander-in-Chief General Feisal Tanjung announced that "in 
principle" there would be no further transfers after the 1997 elections, but that if any 
did take place, they would be "few in number and most likely not involve field 
commanders but rather staff positions."17 With reference to the politically sensitive 
Kodam commanders, ABRI Commander-in-Chief General Feisal Tanjung commented 
that "the corps of Kodam commanders remains solid,"18 noting specifically that "the 
Commander of Kodam Jaya (Jakarta), Major General Wiranto, will continue to hold his 
position until the 1997 election."19 If implemented this pre-election policy would 
effectively serve to exacerbate the existing promotional log-jam within the army elite, 
thus holding back the careers of hundreds of middle-ranking officers. It was on the 
basis of such official statements that a number of observers argued that tire most recent 
waves of transfers were intended to ensure "a similarity of political vision in the
16 "Peluang Lulusan AMN Kian Mengedl: Mutasi di Tubuh ABRI Berkaitan dengan Pemilu," Merdeka, 
November 20,1995.
17 "Pangab: Prinsipnya, Sampai Pemilu tak Ada Lagi Mutasi," Kompas, February 17,1996.
18 "Pangab: Barisan Pangdam Masih Solid," Merdeka, February 17,1996.
19 "Hingga Pemilu tidak ada Pergantian Pangdam," Media Indonesia, February 17,1996.
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military in facing the 1997 elections."20 Yet official statements proved to be misleading 
at best.
A mere one month later, in mid-March, 1996, an additional wave of personnel 
rotations took place in the Armed Forces and army high commands. These rotations 
included the strategic appointments of Lieutenant General Wiranto as Kostrad 
commander, his replacement as Kodam Jaya (Jakarta) commander by Major General 
Sutiyoso, and the appointment of the rising star Major General Yudhoyono as Chief-of- 
Staff Kodam Jaya.21
These personnel transfers were followed by a curious series of statements by senior 
military brass. In May, 1996, Army Chief-of-Staff General R. Hartono announced that 
"in addition to organizational requirements, the change of Kodam commanders is 
related to the upcoming 1997 election." He noted, furthermore, that while he could 
only make suggestions, the final decision lay with ABRI Commander-in-Chief Feisal 
Tanjung.22 Given that Feisal had repeatedly stated that there would be no further 
rotations prior to the May 1997 elections, these comments appear more as a challenge 
to than acknowledgment of the Pangab's authority. In June, ABRI Chief of Staff 
Lieutenant General Soeyono added a further note, warning that if members of AMN 
Class 10 1970 were not appointed to senior positions by 1997 that "our regeneration 
will be late and [the officers] will be slow to mature."23 Again, in obvious contradiction 
to the numerous statements made by ABRI Chief-of-Staff Feisal Tanjung, Soeyono 
noted that the tenure of current Kodam commanders could not be extended simply 
because of the 1997 election.
Indeed, despite the flurry of official statements about pre-election promotional 
policy, yet another wave of personnel changes was announced in August. This, the 
fourth major personnel reshuffling of the year, included the replacement of three 
Kodam commanders: Brig. Gen. Yudhoyono was installed as commander of Kodam II 
Sriwijaya (south Sumatra), Major General Agum Gunelar as commander of Kodam VII 
Wirabuana (Sulawesi), and Maj. Gen. Johnny Lumintang as commander of Kodam VIII 
Trikora (Irian Jaya).24 These moves were followed in September by a fifth reshuffling, 
this involving another one hundred senior officers.25 Despite official statements to the 
contrary, personnel changes were not only continuing, but in fact intensifying.
How then are we to interpret Feisal Tanjung's repeated claims that transfers would 
be postponed until after the election? It can scarcely be doubted that ABRI is preparing 
for the 1997 elections. Senior military officials make nearly daily statements about the 
necessity of "safeguarding" the election. They offer warnings that ABRI will not 
tolerate disruption of the electoral process. And the military daily Angkatan Bersenjata
20 See, for example, the interview with Harold Crouch, "Crouch: ABRI Rapatkan Barisan," Merdeka, 
February 24,1996, and "Dr. A. Yahya Muhaimin: Pergantian Pimpinan ABRI Mengantisipasi Pemilu 
1997," Kompas, March 11,1996.
21 See, for example, "Empat Mutasi di tubuh ABRI dalam 50 Hari," Republika, March 18,1996.
22 "Pergantian Pejabat TNI AD Berkait dengan Pemilu," Kompas, May 27,1996.
23 "Perwira angkatan 70 haras berperan sesudah Pemilu nanti," Angkatan Bersenjata, June 16,1996.
24 "Pergantian di ABRI: Dari Angkatan '65 ke Angkatan '65," Republika, August 12,1996.
25 See, "Jabatan Assospol Kassospol serta Danpussenif diserahterimakan," Angkatan Bersenjata, September 
23,1996, and "70 Pati ABRI alih jabatan," Angkatan Bersenjata, September 24,1996.
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commonly reports on the training of special troops (complete with riot gear) to prevent 
unrest during the election period. But these moves do not adequately explain the 
ongoing personnel changes, nor the apparent inconsistencies between official 
statements denying that further personnel changes would take place and the ongoing 
appointment of new Kodam commanders.
One alternative view, building on a previous analysis offered by "Current Data on 
the Indonesian Military," is that the March and August waves of personnel changes 
represent Palace initiatives pushed through against the will of senior military leaders. 
In this regard, the promotion of Major General Wiranto to the strategic post of Kostrad 
commander and his replacement by Major General Sutiyoso would appear to 
strengthen Presidential security. The same, too, can be said of the appointment of a 
host of Akabri Class 14 1974 graduates , to strategic commands throughout the greater 
Jakarta area, for class leader Kopassus Commander Major General Prabowo is a 
Presidential son-in-law. But while such an analysis can account for the appointment of 
a few individuals, it cannot explain the necessity of increasingly rapid personnel 
changes.
Another possible explanation, proposed here, is that despite an official desire to 
maintain the current command line-up, continued personnel rotations are necessary to 
prevent an increasingly serious promotional log-jam. This is true not only at the 
pinnacle of the officer corps, but also among the middle-ranking officers who form the 
heart and soul of the national security system. This is not to deny that the President 
may benefit from the current personnel shifts. In other words, the necessity of 
maintaining institutional rationality through the continued transfer and promotion of 
army officers may be forcing the hand of the military elite in a way that in fact 
coincides with President Suharto's interests. The rapid rotation of Kodam and Korem 
commanders limits the possibility of an officer developing a regional "interest" or 
personal influence over troops. And the ongoing transfers have allowed the President 
to appoint a core group of officers in and around the capital who not only share similar 
interests, but whose interests largely concur with those of the President.
If the above analysis is correct, it remains to consider where the Indonesian military 
stands vis-k-vis promotional changes. In other words, how serious is the threat posed 
by the changing size of the officer corps? It appears that thanks to the ongoing 
personnel changes, the Indonesian army may already have survived the most obvious 
and direct threat posed by promotional dissatisfaction among the middle and senior 
ranking officer corps. The last remnants of AMN Class 6 1965 are on the verge of 
mandatory retirement at age fifty-five. Although AMN Classes 7 ,8  and 9 have seen a 
smaller percentage of officers reach top command and staff positions, there is no 
possibility of career frustration leading these officers to mount any sort of collective 
action against either military leadership or the President.
Divisions within the Officer Corps
This, however, does not mean that the changing size of the army officer corps 
poses no problems for the Indonesian military. It does so in several less apparent but 
equally important ways, three of which are worth briefly noting.
First, career prospects for Akmil graduates of the early 1970s are relatively poor, 
and dissatisfaction is likely to arise among those officers who are not promoted beyond
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the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. One possibility is that careef stagnation will make 
officers reluctant to use heavy-handed measures against civilian protest. With little or 
no hope of further promotion, there is little reason for these officers to take a tough 
stand on social unrest. This is particularly true when one considers that the best that 
these officers can hope for is to be appointed as Bupati (Regent) or Walikota (Mayor) 
after retirement,26 and that such an appointment may well be in a region where one 
has had active service experience. There is circumstantial evidence that Kodim 
commanders in second-tier cities have "softened" their approach toward social and 
political movements over the past several years.
A second division within the army is emerging between active and retired officers. 
Facing mandatory retirement at the relatively young age of fifty-five, army officers 
could look forward to civilian postings—dinaskarya—as Bupati, Walikota, or a local 
legislative member (DPRD). These appointments not only provided the military with a 
second layer of social control, but also provided employment for retired officers. 
Indeed, the need to provide meaningful employment (and financial remuneration) to 
retired officers has been as influential a factor as "militarization" of the state in 
prompting the appointment of military officers to civilian positions. Although the 
benefits vary by region, these postings have been so attractive as to lead to sharp 
"electoral" competition.27 Although the percentage of Bupati from the military fell from 
50 percent to 41 percent during Rudini's tenure as Interior Minister, the figure has 
remained largely unchanged, in 1996 standing at 44 percent.28 The retirement of the 
relatively large AMN and Akmil classes that graduated in the late 1960s and early 
1970s will place increased pressure on the state and bureaucracy to accommodate the 
personal and financial aspirations of even more retired military officers. Despite these 
needs, senior retired officers recently have called for ABRI to retreat from some 
(though certainly not all) of its social and political activities. It is unclear, however, if 
these calls simply represent dissatisfaction with President Suharto or are part of a 
genuine desire to allow greater space for civilian rule. In any case, military top brass 
are quick to acknowledge that retired officers may have an important influence on 
social and political developments.29
Third, the stabilization in Akmil class size during the first half of the 1970s was not 
permanent. In 1972 Akmil "admits" fell precipitously to under one hundred cadets, 
with a mere eighty-five officers graduating four years later in Akmil Class 16 1976. 
With slight variation, this admission and graduation level was maintained until 1982. 
It was not until 1984 that Akmil class size again increased, rising to 250 cadets, a level 
that has been maintained ever since. This total appears to represent the actual needs of 
the army. What is clear, however, is that this reduction, like the dramatic increase a 
decade earlier, must have important ramifications for the armed forces. These smaller
26 As they are situated outside of the normal military chain of command, these postings require political 
savvy and a proven ability to get along with the civilian bureacracy.
27 An article in the armed forces daily Angkatan Bersenjata noted that in Karawang, one of the fastest 
growing industrial regions and thus one ripe with financial opportunity, there was great interest in 
becoming Bupati. See, "Mendorong Banyak Peminat Jadi Bupati," Angkatan Bersenjata, October 11,1995.
28 See, The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 53 (April 1992): 97, and "Tak 
ada jatah ABRI atau sipil dalam jabatan Kepala Daerah," Angkatan Bersenjata, May 29,1996.
29 "Pumawirawan wamai kondisi sosial politik," Angkatan Bersenjata, September 27,1996.
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Akmil dasses will see a higher percentage of their members become senior officers and 
be appointed to strategic command and staff positions. The structural needs of the 
army for a set number of commissioned officers at any one time also mean that those 
classes immediately preceding this reduction—Classes 14 1974 and 15 1975—will also 
enjoy improved promotional prospects.
But while individual career prospects will improve, the general situation poses 
further structural problems and is bound to lead to important consequences. These 
smaller Akmil classes will in fact not be sufficient to fill all of the command positions 
within the army. There are, to take just one example, currently some two hundred and 
eighty Kodim units in Indonesia, each under the command of a commissioned officer. 
It will thus take more than three full Akmil classes from the late 1970s to staff these 
positions alone.30
Fourth and finally, in the short-run the greatest beneficiary of these fluctuations in 
the size of the army officer corps will be Class 14 1974. Led by Presidential son-in-law 
Major General Prabowo, Commander of the elite Kopassus special forces, this class is 
politically well-placed. Indeed, its monopoly on staff and command postings in and 
around Jakarta suggests that the July, 1996 attack on PDI (Indonesia Democratic Party) 
headquarters was carried out by these officers. Yet the excellent career prospects of this 
and subsequent classes also suggest that these classes will seek to maintain the status 
quo, for officers who foresee better career prospects for themselves would have more 
to lose from political adventurism.
Conclusion
This essay has argued that the increasingly frequent personnel changes among the 
Indonesian military elite during the 1990s are best understood as a function of the 
changing size of the army officer corps. But while the rapidity of personnel rotations 
and promotions is a clear response to the swollen size of the officer corps, the reduced 
size of Akmil Classes beginning in 1976 will lead to a corresponding slow-down in 
personnel changes in the very near future, thus producing greater stability within the 
military.
In the final analysis, such intra-military dynamics will largely determine what 
room for maneuver is available to civilian groups seeking political change in 
Indonesia. The emergence of a truly independent political party in New Order 
Indonesia will not be possible without tacit approval from at least a fragment of the 
Armed Forces. Indeed, the possibility of a civilian politician such as Megawati making 
a serious rim at the Presidency will only be possible if a fraction of the military elite— 
either active or retired—provides support and a degree of protection.
30 One means of overcoming this shortage of commissioned officers would be to allow the appointment of 
NCOs to higher levels of command.

